Air Transport and EC Competition Law by Gorton, Lars
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 21, Issue 3 1997 Article 2
Air Transport and EC Competition Law
Lars Gorton∗
∗
Copyright c©1997 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
Air Transport and EC Competition Law
Lars Gorton
Abstract
This Essay is about air transport and EC competition Law. The air transport industry has,
in many countries, developed as a mixture of public utility and commercial venture. With the
deregulation of the airline market, the EC Commission has also, to an increasing extent, become
involved in the competition aspects of the airline industry. Part I deals with the transportation
industry. Part II discusses liberalization within the EC. Finally, Part III deals with competition
rules.




The air transport industry has, in many countries, devel-
oped as a mixture of public utility and commercial venture. Fre-
quently, governments have been deeply involved in the air trans-
port industry and many rules and regulations have surrounded
its use and commercial operation. The air transport industry
has, to a large extent, developed in an international environ-
ment. It has mainly been geared at passenger transportation
and the carriage of valuable and perishable goods. During the
last decade, faster trains, better trucks, and faster ships with
quicker turnaround have become competitors to the airlines.
The congestion of airports has also contributed to new traffic
schemes.'
The history of aviation is relatively short. Since early times
there have been economic regulations concerning the right to
fly over and land in national territory, the right to pick up and
deliver passengers and cargo,2 and environmental and safety is-
sues. Although U.S. international air carriers have basically been
privately owned, there is a conundrum of U.S. rules and regula-
tions concerning air transport. In many other countries, the air
carriers have been wholly or partly state owned, with monopoly
rights tied to strict government control and regulation. The in-
ternational transport industry has also been controlled through
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1. See, e.g., BLANCO & vAN HouTrE, EC COMPETITION LAW IN THE TRANSPORT SEC-
TOR 1 (1996).
2. See Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation, April 4, 1947, art. 1, pt 1 (stating that
"contracting states recognize that every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty
over the airspace of its territory."). International air transport is - or at least has been
- based on rights of access, which the different states grant one another by multilateral
or bilateral air service treaties, or which are granted upon application. The rights of
access have been generally described by reference to the so called five freedoms of the
air. These freedoms are both of "technical" type and of "commercial" type. See
LoODRUP, LuITFTrr 34 & 116 (1965); BERNITZ, GORTON & GR6NFORS, SJOFART OCH
KONKURRENSRATT, GOTEBORG 19 (1976); CHENG, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANS-
PORT 8 (1962).
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international bodies such as the International Air Transport As-
sociation ("IATA") and the International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation ("ICAO") with respect to tariffs, other conditions of car-
riage, safety measures, and airport slots.'
During a period beginning in the United States in 1978,
there has been a trend of deregulation, particularly with regard
to economic regulation, which has been replaced by correspond-
ing antitrust rules.4 This change in U.S. policy has been of para-
mount importance for the policy makers in Brussels. The
changes caused by the new policy have affected several projects
of the airline industry, both on a macro level and on a micro
level. Thereby, there have been effects on the international level
both intergovernmentally and between the airlines and the dif-
ferent international bodies involved. There have also been ef-
fects on the internal company policy of the different airlines.
Historically, the idea of IATA has been to promote safe, reg-
ular, and economical air transport for the benefit of the peoples
of the world, and to foster air commerce cooperation with
ICAO. The further legal development has included various as-
pects such as the development of the Conditions of Carriage, the
Bermuda Agreement - a bilateral air transport agreement be-
tween the United States and the United Kingdom, one of the
first of almost 4,000 bilateral air transport agreements signed
and registered with ICAO - as well as a number of Traffic Con-
ferences for the purpose of controlling prices charged by inter-
national airlines. The Traffic Conferences have been central in
reaching nearly 400 resolutions covering many aspects of air
travel, including multilateral interline traffic agreements and
passenger and cargo services conference resolutions governing
standard formats and technical specifications for tickets and air
waybills. The IATA Tariff Conference was granted a block ex-
emption from the provisions of community competition law,5
but IATA's legislative importance with respect to air transport
3. An airport slot is the time allocated to airlines at airports during which they may
use the runway for take off and landing. See, e.g., DEVINE, THE ECONOMICS OF COMMU-
NITY AIR TRANSPORT AND THE IMPACT OF AIRPORT SLOT ALLOCATION (1997); Sundberg,
Airline Deregulation. Legal and Administrative Problems [hereinafter Airline Deregulation], in
GENERAL REPORTS XIV INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 541; VAN BAEL & BELLIS, COMPETITION
LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1030 (1988).
4. See Airline Deregulation, supra note 3, at 535.
5. IATA, 50 DYNAMIC YEARS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANS-
PORT ASSOCIATION (1995).
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related to the European Community has gradually decreased
since the development of community legislation on air transport
and competition policy in this particular field.6
Certain features should be kept in mind with respect to air-
line service. There is an important distinction between sched-
uled air service and charter, a distinction which has been upheld
in much legislation.' National governments have also given par-
ticular preference to national "flag" carriers, which are usually
scheduled airlines, before charter airlines and other scheduled
airlines.8 In order to compensate for a statutory obligation to
operate services, even at a loss, tariffs, among other things, have
been subject to approval. Because the regulatory system gener-
ally prevented the sale of tickets at prices below the approved
tariffs, "national carriers" for a long time never had to face real
competition. They did not have to fear foreign competition of
scheduled traffic due to bilateral air service agreements which
divided capacity between the "national carriers" involved.
Apart from the competition policy, certain other factors
have played an important role for changes on airline industry,
such as environmental factors, like pollution and noise, and con-
gestion and technological factors, like size of air planes, jet en-
gines, and computerization. Thus, one could make a distinction
between competition questions related to airlines and ancillary
service on the one hand, and on the other hand, various policy
and competition questions.
Thus the international aviation scene has changed drasti-
cally. After mergers and bankruptcies, the number of U.S. inter-
national air carriers has diminished radically, for example, Pan
Am and TWA, and new low budget airlines, such as South West
Airlines and Value Jet, have entered the market, and new alli-
ances with regional air carriers have sprung up. On the world-
wide scene, several forms of cooperation have been used, and
now international alliances are also developing at a growing
pace.
The changes occurring have taken many different direc-
tions: the privatization of state-owned flag carriers, new forms of
cooperation between air carriers and also between aircraft man-
6. See BLAco & VAN HoUTrE, supra note 1, at 26.
7. See SUNDBERG, AIR CHARTER. A STUDY IN LEGAL DEVELOPMENT 51 (1961).
8. See Airline Deregulation, supra note 3, at 571.
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ufacturers, hub bypass9 due to congestion and also the comfort
of passengers, mergers and joint ventures, the coming up of new
regional air carriers, and new alliances among the large interna-
tional carriers and the smaller regional carriers.
Different types of cooperation may have a comparatively
narrow scope, such as common technical exchange agreements,
common training programs, cargo handling or luggage han-
dling, reservation systems, and inter line agreements. But they
may also have a wider coverage, as seen, for example, in
franchise agreement" and full-fledged joint venture agree-
ments.
With the deregulation of the airline market, the EC Com-
mission has also, to an increasing extent, become involved in the
competition aspects of the airline industry.
The promotion of competition is considered one of the fun-
damental means to achieve a number of objectives of Article F of
the Treaty of Rome."1 The Treaty also sets out as a goal in Arti-
cle 3e the creation of a common transport policy ("CTP").12
The Treaty contains general rules on freedom of movement of
services, 13 transportation," competition," state aid,"a and safety,
which in various ways may serve as instruments to strengthen or
weaken competition. Furthermore the Merger regulation plays
an important role. 17 As a general observation, the relation be-
9. Hub bypass is where an airline, instead of servicing the preferred large airports,
carries passengers directly between smaller airports.
10. To my knowledge, there is so far no EC case involving the franchising of air
carriage, and the method is quite new in this area. One of the few cases involving
franchising is Pronuptia v. Pronuptia, Case 161/84, [1986] E.C.R. 353, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R.
414, 445. See generally VALENTINE KoRAH, FRANCHISING AND THE EEC COMPETITION RULES
(1989). Commission Regulation 4087/88 provides a block exemption for distribution
and service franchises, which might also apply to airline franchises, even if they are not
the immediate target. In aviation, this cooperation form has been used by British Air-
ways, Delta, and Lufthansa. Commission Regulation No. 4087/88, OJ. L 359/46
(1988)
11. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art F,
298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty] in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES (EC Off l Pub. Off. 1987).
12. See BLANCO & VAN HOUTrE, supra note 1, at 5 & 7.
13. EEC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 59, 298 U.N.T.S. at 40; cf id. art. 52ff, 298
U.N.T.S. at 37.
14. Id. art. 74-84, 298 U.NT.S. at 44-47.
15. Id. art. 85-90, 298 U.N.T.S. at 46-50.
16. Id. art. 91-92, 298 U.N.T.S. at 50-51.
17. See Commission Regulation No. 4064/89, O.J. L 257 (1990).
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tween Article 61 on the freedom to provide services, and the
transportation and competition rules should be noted. Another
general observation is that the Commission has become gradu-
ally more interested in involving itself in the deregulation of the
air transport industry, in bringing up the air transport policy on
a European level, and in applying the competitions rules to the
airlines. This has also meant that both Directorate General IV
(competition) and Directorate General VII (transportation)
have become involved, causing a certain conflict of interest.
There has, thus, been a development leading to a gradual in-
crease of new regulations and directives. aimed at the airline in-
dustry.
I. THE TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY
A. In General
The transportation industry involves the carriage of goods
or passengers. There are, however, substantial differences be-
tween the various modes of transport with respect to their use
and markets. Air carriage is mainly geared at the transportation
of passengers, and carriage by ship mainly at the carriage of
goods. Private cars, buses, publicly operated trains; domestic, re-
gional, global aircraft; and various types of trade vessels may
compete with each other in different market segments. Thus,
short haul air carriage may, for example, have private cars as its
most fierce competitor.
These factors also explain the differences in the legal frame-
work between the different means of transportation and the dif-
ferent trades. As already mentioned, there is one fundamental
distinction in all transport services, namely that between liner
service (scheduled service) and charter (tramp). Another im-
portant feature, particularly in relation to air traffic, is govern-
ment involvement as owner, financier, and regulator.
Seen from the customer's point of view "air carriage" means
the combination of various types of services, which may not be
distinguishable, that serves him well and at a reasonable price.
Thus certain items such as ground handling, interline service,
coordination of air schedules, reservations and ticketing, and air-
port congestion and air traffic control are different parts that
together make up a package of air carriage service. In many
ways IATA has contributed to the development of a rather effi-
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cient total service for the passenger, and the criticism against air
carriers is largely a consequence of high prices.
B. The Swedish Market and the Competition Act (1993:20)
Mention of the Swedish market should also be made as
there is now in Sweden a competition act (1993:20) considered
largely to be a blue copy of the EC Competition rules. It does
not, however, contain the particular rules in the forms of subse-
quent regulations eventually developed in the European Com-
munity.
Article 6 of the Swedish act largely corresponds to Article 85
of the Rome Treaty, Article 19 to Article 86, and Article 34 to the
Merger Regulation."8 Many of the block exemptions and other
regulations or directives have, however, no equivalent Swedish
rule, but it is specifically stated in the preparatory work that the
Swedish competition act shall be applied in conformity with the
EC law as it develops.
Because the EC rules on air transport have no set counter-
part in domestic Swedish law, the question will sooner or later
be, whether the whole "EC package of rules" will apply and
whether Swedish competition authorities will in some instances
fall back on the general Swedish rules only, which may appear
tougher than the EC rules, lacking the relative precision given in
later EC block exemptions and other rules.
C. Rules On Air Transportation in the EC
Title IV of the Rome Treaty singled out transportation as an
industry exempted from the general EC competition rules and
policies. Considerations were instead given to developing a com-
mon transport policy. Whereas Articles 74-83 of the Rome
Treaty contain certain rules applicable to road, railroad, and in-
land waterway transportation, Article 84 states:
1. The provisions of this Title shall apply to transport by rail,
road and inland waterway.
2. The Council may, acting by a qualified majority, decide
whether, to what extent and by what procedure appropriate
provisions may be laid down for sea and air transport. The
18. Council Regulation No. 4064/89. O.J. L 395/1 (1989), corrected version in O.J.
L 257/13 (1990).
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procedural provisions of Articles 75(1) and (3) shall apply.'"
Though Regulation 17/62 and the basic competition rules,
Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty were generally imple-
mented at the same time, Regulation 141/62 exempted the
transport sector from the application of Regulation 17/62.
Notwithstanding Regulation 141/62, the Commission found that
regulation 17/62 still applied to certain services which are ancil-
lary to air transport, such as ground handling service, 20 com-
puter reservation systems, 21 and computerized air cargo informa-
tion systems.
Thus, for a long time, competition in the air transport mar-
ket remained highly restricted with little interference from the
EC Commission. Air traffic to a large extent continued to be
based on bilateral agreements between states containing capac-
ity-fixing provisions. International air transport in the EC also
continued to be heavily regulated with high national barriers
against the entry of new competing air lines. Tariffs were largely
preset and maintained.2
In 1974, the European Court of Justice in the French Seaman
case 23 ruled that the general principles in the Rome Treaty, in-
cluding the competition rules in Articles 85 and 86, had general
application. This came to have immediate effect in the field of
maritime law, where the so-called UNCTAD Code was discussed.
The case did not, however, have much impact on the air trans-
port sector, and its practical effects in aviation were, for the time
being, limited. Some attempts towards liberalization were then
taken gradually, such as the first memorandum published by the
Commission in 1979,24 and the Council Directive liberalizing
scheduled inter-regional services. But by large no far reaching
19. EEC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 84, 298 U.N.T.S. at 47.
20. Commission Decision No. 85/121/EEC, OJ. L 46/51 (1985).
21. Commission Decision No. 88/589/EEC, OJ. L 317/47 (1988).
22. In 1986, before the enactment of Regulation 3975/87, the Commission made
use of Art. 89 in connection with capacity and revenue sharing arrangements, joint
vetures, and etc., in violation of Art. 85. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNI-
TIES, SIXTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1986, at 36 (1987); COMMISSION OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SEVENTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1987, at 46
(1988); COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY 1980,. at 136-38 (1981).
23. Commission v. French Republic, Case 167/73, [1974] E.C.R. 359.
24. 12 E.C. BULL., no. 5 (1979).
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measures were taken.2 5
In the mid 1980s, changes came gradually, mainly due to
the deregulation of domestic air transport in the United States,
which affected the structure of the U.S. industry, its competitive-
ness with other airlines, and the general worldwide air carriage
"climate";26 the decision of the European Court of Justice
("ECJ") in the Nouvelle Fronti~re case, 7 which confirmed that the
Treaty's competition rules applied to air transport; and the con-
clusion of the Single European Act in 1986,28 whereby a quali-
fied majority was adopted for decisions in many cases involving
the air carriage sector.
The latter meant that an internal market for EC air trans-
port was to be achieved by gradually breaking down restrictions
on competition between airlines of different States, abolishing
national barriers, and moving from a bilateral to a multilateral
system. In addition, competition rules were to be applied in or-
der to eliminate anti-competitive arrangements between airlines.
This is also how the air transport policy came to develop side by
side with the competition rules and policies. It is, then, also im-
portant to keep in mind that on an EC Commission level, air
transportation and competition fall under two different director-
ates, namely DG VII and DG IV, respectively.
II. LIBERALIZATION WITHIN THE EC
A. In General
Following the 1979 memorandum issued by the EC Com-
mission with respect to air transport policy,29 a second one was
published, in 1984.30
Thus, by the end of 1987, a first package of liberalization
25. Balfour, Air Transport - A Community Success Stoiy?, in CML REVIEW 1026 (1994);
see SLOT & DAGTOGLOU, TOWARD A COMMUNITY AIR TRANSPORT POLICY 5 & 63 (1989);
BALFOUR, AIR LAW AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 5 & 19 (1990).
26. Airline Deregulation, supra note 3, at 536.
27. Ministere Public v. Lucas Asjes, Joined Cases 209-213/84, [1986] E.C.R. 1425,
[1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 173.
28. Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter
SEA] (amending Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,
1957 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
(EC Offl Pub. Off. 1987)).
29. 12 E.C. BULL., nO. 5 (1979).
30. Commission of the European Communities, Progress Towards the Develop-
ment of a Community Air Transport Policy, COM (84) 72 Final.
1998]
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measures was adopted.3 The European Parliament made an
evaluation of the effects of the first package, and in view of this
evaluation, the Commissioner concluded that the first package
brought too little change, and that harsher steps were needed in
order for better results to be achieved through a second pack-
age. The Commissioner also stated that only a further, well bal-
anced, liberalization of competition could lead to progress to-
wards a liberal common transport market.
The second package was adopted by the Council in 1990
revoking the provisions of the first one on fares, access, and ca-
pacity, and replacing them with more liberal provisions, which
will be discussed below.12 In a further step, a third package
meant a more radical change, including three regulations.33 It
removed most barriers to an internal community air transporta-
tion market and introduced new rules on airline licensing.
3 4
B. Licensing of Air Carriers
According to the regulation on licensing an airline 35 ("Li-
censing Regulation"), an applicant seeking a license to operate
an airline has to satisfy certain requirements, such as financial
and technical standards and nationality of ownership36 and con-
trol. There has been much discussion on the interpretation of
the ownership and control requirements enshrined in Article
4(2) of the 'Licensing Regulation.37 In Swissair/Sabena" the
31. Council Directive No. 87/601, O.J. L 374/12 (1987); Council Decision No. 87/
602/EEC, O.J. L 374/19 (1987); Council Regulation No. 3975/87, O.J. L 374/19
(1987); see BLANco & VAN HOUTTE, supra note 1, at 23.
32. Council Regulation No. 2342/90, O.J. L 217/1 (1990); Council Regulation No.
2343/90, O.J. L 217/8 (1990); see BLANCO & VAN HoUTrE, supra note 1, at 24.
33. Council Regulation No. 2407-2409/92, O.J. L 240/1 (1992); see BLANco & vAN
HOUTrE, supra note 1, at 25.
34. It deserves to be mentioned that several different types of rules have been in-
troduced gradually, such as rules on computerized reservation systems, ground han-
dling, airport charges, and passenger protection (denied boarding), which I here leave
out. See Airline Deregulation, supra note 3, at 541; see also VAN BAEL & BELLIS, COMPETI-
TION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 655 & 664 (1994). I shall, however, before
discussing the competition rules related to airlines, briefly touch upon certain rules,
which have been introduced as a consequence of the second, and to some extent the
third, packages. These rules concern fares, access, and capacity.
35. See Council Regulation No. 2407/92, O.J. L 240/1 (1992).
36. It deserves to be mentioned that there should no longer be any restriction on
nationality requirements with respect to an airline company as far as EU citizens or
companies are concerned.
37. Council Regulation No. 2407/92, art. 4(2), O.J. L 240/1, at 2 (1992).
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Commission clarified those requirements.
Firstly, Article 4(2) was essentially designed to safeguard the
interests of the Community's air transport industry, and to en-
sure that the market access was effectively exploited by Commu-
nity air carriers and not by third country air carriers. This is,
thus, another area where the European market is opened and
free internally with common barriers to the outside. Secondly,
50% plus one share of the equity capital of the air carrier was to
be held by Member State nationals or companies. An airline
that fulfilled these requirements would be granted an operating
license allowing it to operate to almost any destination within
the Community. Moreover, the Commission stressed that the
authorization was required, exclusively for "the purposes of en-
suring safety and liability standards." Nonetheless, the national
licensing authorities have had certain leeway in applying the reg-
ulation, which may lead to somewhat diverging national prac-
tices, and, ultimately, distortions of competition within the com-
mon market.,9 Therefore, the Council called upon the Commis-
sion to examine the application of the rules in order to ensure
their uniform enforcement by all Member States.
C. Access to Air Routes
The Regulation on Access4" requires Member States to allow
any licensed Community carrier to operate between any two
points within the Community, subject to certain exceptions. Ac-
cording to this regulation, there was a progressive implementa-
tion of market access rights along the following timetable: a) as
ofJanuary 1993, access to routes between Member States in prin-
ciple was to be, and basically has been, fully liberalized; b) until
January 1996, access to domestic routes was partly restricted by
allowing Member States to maintain exclusive concessions which
were granted prior to the entry into force of the first package on
routes, where other forms of transport could not ensure an ade-
quate and uninterrupted service; c) until April 1997, access to
domestic routes could be restricted for air carriers licensed in
the respective Member State; and d) cabotage operations contin-
38. Commission Decision No. 404/95/EC, O.J. L 165 (1995).
39. MicHAL NIEJAHR, THE NEXT IMPLEMENTATION ROUND (1996).
40. Council Regulation No. 2408/92, O.J. L 240/8 (1992).
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ued to be partially limited, but the limitations principally ex-
pired in March 1997, completing the liberalization process.
D. Fares and Rates for Air Services
The regulation on fares4" removes all restrictions on Com-
munity air carriers, whether on a scheduled or non-scheduled
basis, from charging what fares they wish on intra-Community air
routes. Member States cannot require prior authorization of
fares more than twenty-four hours before they become effective.
The regulation contains safeguard clauses that, under certain
conditions, allow for intervention by Member States and the
Commission in view of withdrawing excessively high basic fares
or stopping further fare decreases in cases of sustained down-
ward developments of air fares.
E. Slots
IATA has been deeply involved in the slot allocation in in-
ternational air service.4 2 The airlines regulate themselves in ac-
cordance with certain principles and guidelines set up by IATA.
One such principle, known as Grandfather Rights, gives "abso-
lute priority [to] .. .an airline using a particular slot during a
season.., to continue using it during future corresponding sea-
sons; it may change the type of service, type of aircraft, even the
destination and still enjoy the right to use the slot to the exclu-
sion of other interested airlines."4 Under Regulation 1617/93,
slot allocation and airport scheduling concerning air services be-
tween Community airports have been exempted because it "can
improve the utilization of airport capacity and airspace, facilitate
air traffic control, and help spread out the supply of air trans-
port services from the airport."" The exemption requires an
open and non-discriminatory application of the measures
agreed-upon; thus, in order to be exempt from Article 85(1),
consultations on slot allocation and airport scheduling must be
open to all interested airlines, and any rules of priority must not
be related to carrier identity or nationality or category of service,
whether directly or indirectly.
41. Council Regulation No. 2409/92, O.J. L 240/15 (1992).
42. See BLANCO & VAN HOUTrE, supra note 1, at 181; DEVINE, supra note 3, at 3.
43. BLANCo & VAN HouTrE, supra note 1, at 181.
44. Commission Regulation No. 1617/93, O.J. L 155/1 (1993).
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For the exemption to apply, new entrants must have priority
regarding fifty percent of newly-created, unused, or given-up
slots. In addition, carriers participating in the consultations
must be granted access to certain information relating to slot
allocation.
There has been much discussion on the distribution of the
economic value of airports slots, and particularly whether the
slots have an economic value to be enjoyed by the party, could
be sold, or should be given up for free.4 5 The slots have been
used several times by the Commission as a tool when discussing
questions related to mergers and alliances.
III. THE COMPETITION RULES
A. In General
It is apparent the rules already mentioned have a direct or
indirect influence on the competitive environment of airline ser-
vice. Parallel to this development, a number of competition
rules have developed.
Following the deregulation of airline transportation in the
United States, there has been a restructuring of U.S. airlines in-
volved in international, national, or regional air traffic.4 6 Gener-
ally, the number of airlines has decreased, but on the whole the
competition seems to have led to lower rates. In the European
market, a similar development could be discerned, but in Eu-
rope many governments have been directly or indirectly finan-
cially involved in "national flag carriers." Many European air-
lines - like, for that matter, air carriers from other parts of the
world - in order to survive, have developed various types of co-
operation arrangements, both with other international carriers
and with regional air carriers, whether in the form of capacity
planning, revenue sharing, alliances, mergers, franchising ar-
rangement, or code sharing, all which have competitive implica-
tions.
As mentioned above, the EC competition rules were previ-
ously not directly applicable to air transport, despite the Com-
mission's 1979 proposal.47 This changed, however, with the
45. See DEVINE, supra note 3, at 40.
46. See Airline Deregulation, supra note 3, at 547.
47. 12 E.C. BULL., no. 5 (1979).
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ECJ's decision in the Nouvelle Frontire case.4
8
The Nouvelle Fontire case, although somewhat particular,
has been understood to lay down the rule that competition rules
apply to air transport even in the absence of an implementing
regulation. Both the Commission and the competition authori-
ties of the Member States from then on had the competence to
extend the enforcement of the competition rules to air carriage.
As mentioned above, the Commission subsequently put forward
certain proposals in the field of competition law in relation to
airline service, which were adopted in December 1987 and came
to form a part of the first package as Council Regulations (EEC)
3975/87 and 3976/87. 4 9
There were then three different procedural frameworks in
which EC competition law could be applied to the air carriage
sector, namely:
A) through the general implementing Regulation 17/62, as
far as services ancillary to air transport were concerned;
B) through the limited regime of art. 88 and 89 of the treaty,
as far as flights between the Community and third countries
were concerned; and
C) through the air transport implementing regulations, Reg-
ulations 3975/87 and Regulation 3976/87, as far as flights be-
tween Community airports were concerned.
In 1992, the Council adopted the third package, introduced
some new rules, and sharpened some of the former ones. A
Community-wide licensing framework was established for air car-
riers in the European Community,5° and certain previously pro-
tected routes were opened to all EC carriers as of January 1,
1993, with the remaining routes opened up as of April 1, 1997.51
Furthermore, there was a liberalization of the Member State-
based fare approval system. 52 It was also thought that this liberal-
ization was to be backed up through additional competition
rules."
.48. Ministere Public v. Lucas Asjes, Joined Cases 209-213/84, [1986] E.C.R. 1425,
[1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 173.
49. Council Regulation No. 3975-76/87, OJ. L 374/1 (1987).
50. Council Regulation No. 2407/92, OJ. L 240/1 (1992).
51. Council Regulation No. 2408/92, OJ. L 240/8 (1992).
52. Council Regulation No. 2409/92, O.J. L 240/15 (1992).
53. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXTH REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY 1991, at 69 (1992).
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The Regulation 2409/92 in Article 6 also contains the basis
for the prohibition of air fares which are "excessively high" or
which are so low so as to result in "widespread losses among all
air carriers concerned." Pressure from certain new low budget
airlines cause Europe's leading carriers to consider new steps to
protect their traffic. This included a couple of regulations relat-
ing to competition rules, of which one extended the scope of the
existing regulation authorizing the issuance of block exemp-
tions, made some changes to the categories of agreement eligi-
ble for exemption, and extended the period of validity of any
block exemptions adopted beyond the end of 1992.5"
Below I shall deal somewhat with the application of the
competition regulations and with those block exemptions which
have been introduced regarding mergers, capacity planning, rev-
enue sharing, and tariff consultation.
B. Concentrations
Apart from Articles 85 and 86 in the Treaty, there are two
Council Regulations relating to the control of concentrations be-
tween undertakings.55 Although the merger regulation is a com-
paratively late step with respect to EC antitrust law, I shall in this
connection take up some merger and acquisition cases from the
air industry.
One case involving aircraft, illustrative as to the determina-
tion of aircraft market, is the Aerospatiale -Alenia/De Havilland.56
Aerospatiale SNI and Alenia-Aeritalia produce civil and mili-
tary aircraft, satellites, and space systems. At the time Alenia and
Aerospatiale already controlled the Groupment d'Interet
Economique ("GIE") Avions de Transport Regionale ("ATR")
the most important producer of short haul turbo-props aircraft
in the world, and were going jointly to buy from Boeing the as-
sets of the de Havilland division.
Because the aggregate turnover of Aerospatiale and de Hav-
illand was over 5 billion ECU, and the Community turnover of
Aerospatiale and Alenia over 250 million, the proposed merger
had a Community dimension.
54. Council Regulation No. 2410/92, O.J. L 240/18 (1992).
55. Council Regulation No. 4069/89, O.J. L 257/13 (1989); Council Regulation
No. 4064/89, O.J. L 395/1 (1989).
56. Commission Decision No. 91/619/EEC, O.J. L 334/42 (1991).
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Aerospatiale and Alenia gave notice to the Commission of
their plan to buy de Havilland. After having first suspended the
merger for further examination under Article 2 on June 12,
1991, the Commission initiated proceedings under Article
6(1) (c) of the Regulation.
In order to establish the relevant market, the relevant prod-
uct market and the relevant geographical market had to be de-
termined. The Commission had to go through the market struc-
ture and determine the impact of the new concentration. In this
connection, the Commission had to assess the strength of the
remaining competition's strength and the customers' strength
and the potential entry into the market.
The market was considered to be the worldwide market (ex-
cluding China and Eastern Europe) because "there is no tangi-
ble barriers to the importation of these aircraft into the Commu-
nity and there are negligible costs of transportation."
The analysis of the relevant produce market was divided
into the demand side and the supply side of the market. Accord-
ing to the Commission, the turbo-props from 20 to 70 seat air-
craft were not in the same market as the jet aircraft because the
latter were more expensive to buy and operate. The Commis-
sion also found that there was a difference in relation to the sav-
ing of time for the customer. The aircraft under 20 seats could
not be seen as belonging to the same market. Thus, the Com-
mission established that in order to reflect the different condi-
tions of competition, the product market had to be divided into
three segments, distinguishing between commuters with 20 to 39
seats, 40 to 59 seats, and 60 seats and over.
The parties argued that there were only two segments,
namely the 20 to 50 seats and over because most national regula-
tions require a second air hostess in the latter segment. Later,
the parties argued that the number of seats was not the only con-
sideration, but technical and performance factors were decisive
for the choice of aircraft. The Commission did not accept these
arguments.
The Commission did not think that a new type of aircraft
would be in the market as it takes many years to develop such a
product. It was, however, always possible for a manufacturer to
"stretch" an old model, but such a new model would then be in a
different segment and thus not in the same relevant product
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market. It was also estimated that the short haul turbo-props air-
craft demand could be maintained until the mid-1990s and then
decline and stabilize. The Commission also found that there was
no synergy between jet aircraft development and turbo-props air-
craft, explaining why Boeing wanted to sell de Havilland and
why the other jet aircraft manufactures were not likely to enter
the market.
The parties also argued that IPTN from Indonesia had de-
veloped a 50 seat turbo-props aircraft for the domestic market
and might enter the relevant market in the mid-1990s.
In evaluating the relevant market share of the proposed
merger, the Commission added the number of units already de-
livered plus the ones in order but not yet delivered and found
that the combined ATR/de Havilland entity would have:
-64% of the world market and 72% of the Community
market in the 40 to 59 seats segment;
-76% of the world market and 72% of the Community
market in the 60 and over seats segment;
-50% of the world market and 65% of the Community
market in the overall turbo-props aircraft market.
The Commission found that such a share of the market
would eventually lead to an even larger share. The new entity
would concert its sale strategy by offering more flexibility in its
prices and financing. Because it would be able to offer the
whole range of commuters, ATR/de Havilland would offer some
mixed deals to airlines in need of different sizes of aircraft. Fur-
thermore, the new group would have a strong position in the 51
to 70 seats segment where the most important expansion was ex-
pected in the European market.
Also, according to the Commission the elimination of de
Havilland, the world's second most important manufacturer,
would have a major impact on the structure of the competition,
especially as de Havilland was planning to enter the 51 to 70
seats market with its Dash 8-400. The airline companies could
make substantial savings on the pilots training and maintenance
by using only one "technology". Because the new entity would
be the only one to offer the whole range of commuter to its cus-
tomers, it would increase even more its position on the market.
By gaining the customers of de Havilland, the new entity would
even broaden its base of customers up to 80, and the savings of
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using only one "technology", a "locked-in" effect of the custom-
ers would be created. The Commission further assessed the
strength of the competitors and found that Fokker would be the
most important competitor and with only 9% of the overall mar-
ket and 22% of the 40 to 59 seats segment, Fokker would be the
most important competitor to the new entity.
The Commission blocked the merger, finding that "the
combined entity, ATR/de Havilland, could act to a significant
extent independently of its competitors and customers on the
world markets as defined for commuters of 40 to 59 seats and 60
seats and over." It was the first time that the Commission
blocked a merger, and its decision "was criticized for an unduly
narrow product market definition that exaggerated economic
power, which is a criticism on the application of the Regula-
tion."57
I concur in the criticism of the Commission's relevant mar-
ket segmentation, but for different reasons. For one, the new
entity would be able to offer commuters the whole range of the
market. Also, the "locked-in" effect was based on the savings
made due to the use of only one "technology," but in fact, the
ATR and the de Havilland would still work with two different
"technologies".
Also, the supply market side could be criticized. Due to the
predicted decline of demand in the mid-1990s, the Commission
did not foresee the entry of new competitors. However, if ITPN
from Indonesia and Aero Czechoslovak developed a short haul
turbo-props aircraft, they might very well enter the market. In
fact, the reasons why Boeing wanted to sell de Havilland were
not clearly discussed by the Commission.
It is hard to evaluate the immediate effects of this decision
on airline service, and whether the "product market" as deter-
mined here would be upheld with respect to airline service.
Furthermore it is interesting to compare the Commission's
view in this case with its clearance of the merger between Boeing
Company and McDonnell Douglas Corporation.
During the negotiations with the Commission, Boeing of-
fered certain commitments to resolve the competition problems
57. WEATHERILL &:BEAUMONT, EC LAw 827 (1995).
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which were identified by the Commission and which primarily
included the following items:
-the cessation of existing and future exclusive supply
deals;
-commitments to report annually to the Commission
on military and civil aeronautics R & D projects bene-
fitting from public funding;
-the "ring-fencing" of MDC's commercial aircraft activi-
ties;
-the licensing of patents to other jet aircraft activities;
and
-commitments not to abuse relationships with custom-
ers and suppliers.
The Commission considered the commitments given by
Boeing as sufficient to clear the identified competition
problems. In its considerations, the Commission found that the
market for large commercial jet aircraft is world-wide and that
the EU is an integral and important part of this world market. It
is also stated that European airlines should account for almost a
third of future demand over the next ten years period, and that
the combined market share of Boeing and MDC is about two-
thirds of the EU market. In its considerations for clearing the
merger the Commission had to balance commercial and military




Principally, Article 85(1) (a) prohibits price-fixing, and, as
mentioned above, the ECJ stated in Nouvelle Frontiire8 that Arti-
cle 85 might apply to the fixing of air tariffs within the frame-
work of IATA. Tariff consultations have, however, not been at-
tacked as price fixing by the Commission. Following Regulation
1617/93, 5 the Commission granted a block exemption to cer-
tain consultations as to passenger ticket prices, as well as, cargo
tariff rates on scheduled air services between airports within the
European Community. The exemption with respect to cargo tar-
58. Ministere Public v. Lucas Asjes, Joined Cases 209-213/84, [1986] E.C.R. 1425,
[1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 173.
59. Commission Regulation No. 1617/93, OJ. L 155/18 (1993).
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iffs has, however, been withdrawn during 1996, and from July 1,
1997, the air carriers have had to abide by the new situation.
Recital 5 of Regulation 1617/93 underlines that the consul-
tations must not amount to tariff fixing in practice. The Regula-
tion applies, provided that such consultations are voluntary and
open to any carrier operating or intending to operate direct or
indirect services on the route in question, and that the partici-
pants are not bound by any proposal.
Art. 4(1) (f) of the Regulation lays down that any such con-
sultation on air fares and cargo rates must not also involve dis-
cussions on capacity or agreements on agents' remuneration "or
other elements of the tariffs discussed." Recital 5 further adds
that tariff consultations "must not exceed the aim of facilitating
interlining" and have to be "limited to fares and rates which give
rise to actual interlining." Thus, the Regulation takes into con-
sideration the passenger's/cargo owner's interest in purchasing
a single ticket - combining services of more than one carrier
and, provided that it is permitted by the first reservation, to
change a reservation to another service on the same route oper-
ated by the same carrier. According to Article 4(1) (b) of the
Regulation, it is, however, permissible for a carrier who is partici-
pating in tariff consultations to refuse the combination of its
services with those of another participating carrier or refuse vol-
untary reservation changes "for objective and non-discriminatory
reasons of a technical or commercial nature, in particular where
the air carrier effecting carriage is concerned with the credit
worthiness of the air carrier who would be collecting payment."
The British Midland v. Air Lingus case6° also involved the
question of refusal to interline. The Commission has considered
the interlining and the tariff consultation between airline carri-
ers. Interlining is regarded as one of IATA's major achieve-
ments. It consists of the Multilateral Interline Traffic Agree-
ment ("MITA"), where airlines are authorized to sell each
other's services. As a result, a single ticket can be issued com-
prising different segments to be performed by different airlines.
The main advantages of MITA are: a) passengers can buy a sin-
gle ticket providing for transportation by different carriers, b)
airlines are able to supplement their network and frequencies,
and c) travel agents benefit by avoiding the loss of time and ex-
60. Commission Decision No. 92/213/EEC, O.J. L 96/34 (1992).
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tra-work involved in issuing separate tickets. The vast majority of
the world's airlines, accounting for approximately 95% of all
scheduled traffic, participate in the interlining system.
Similarly, the airlines organized under LATA meet every year
to discuss Cargo and Passenger Tariffs. This is riot necessarily an
infringement of Community rules, due to certain exemptions
from the EC competition rules.
The British Midland/Aer Lingus case had its roots in 1964,
when Aer Lingus concurred with British Midland's participation
in the MITA. After having been awarded the right to operate
London's Heathrow airport to Dublin, on February 22, 1989
British Midland announced its intention to commence services
on that route on April 28, 1989. On April 7, 1989, Aer Lingus
gave notice that it terminated its concurrence with the British
Midland participation in MITA, effective on May 7. Further-
more, Aer Lingus refused to interchange its and British Mid-
land's tickets on the Heathrow to Dublin route. Aer Lingus did
not cancel its interline agreements with the other airline operat-
ing on the route. Aer Lingus declared that it wished to remain a
dominant carrier, while British Midland did not have the re-
sources to offer a similar frequency or service.
On February 7 and 8, 1991, Aer Lingus attended the Special
Meeting of the Cargo and Passenger Tariff conference. At the
opening of the Conference, the Aer Lingus representative de-
clared that the company would not participate in consultations
concerning the routes from Dublin to Amsterdam, London, and
Paris, but nevertheless took part in the discussion.
The Commission found that Aer Lingus infringed both Arti-
cles 85(1) and 86 of EC Treaty. The infringement of Article
85(1) was due to the fact that tariff consultations could not ex-
ceed the lawful purpose of facilitating the interlining. Aer
Lingus was obliged to interline with all carriers involved.
Moreover, Aer Lingus, in refusing to interline with British
Midland on the route from Dublin to London, pursued a strat-
egy which - even if not wholly effective - was both selective
and exclusionary, and restricted the development of competi-
tion on the Heathrow to Dublin route, thereby infringing Article
86 of the EC Treaty.
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The Commission, by Article 12 of Regulation 3975/87,61
may impose fines on an undertaking participating in an infringe-
ment of Article 85(1) or Article 86 of the EC Treaty. In fixing
the amount of the fine, regard was taken both to the gravity and
duration of the infringement. The Commission found that the
imposition of a fine on Aer Lingus was justified in so far as the
infringement was related to Article 86. In view of the fact that
Commission Regulation 84/9162 had only just entered into force
when the infringement related to Article 85 was committed, the
Commission did not, however, impose a fine on account of the
parallel violation of Article 85. The Commission considered that
a duty to interline with British Midland should be imposed on
Aer Lingus for a two-year period, and during this period the
Commission had the possibility to decide whether this duty
needed to be extended. A fine was imposed on Aer Lingus.
This brings us back to one of the main problems in EC com-
petition law, namely the determination of the market, the rele-
vant product market, and the geographical market. In connec-
tion with the de Havilland case, a determination was made of the
relevant product market. In my view, and I think this is sup-
ported by the Commission and case law, the relevant product
market should be regarded as scheduled air transport of passen-
gers. The Commission has stated on a number of occasions that
scheduled air transport is not substitutable for charter traffic,
and it follows that transport of cargo is not substitutable for pas-
senger services.
The relevant product market, however, also has to be seen
in light of the geographical market, because depending on the
geographical market, air transport meets competition from
other means of transport. Such means of transport may include
train, bus, high-speed ferry, and car. It is commonly accepted
that, over certain distances, surface means of transport may com-
pete with air transport.
When it comes to determining the relevant geographical
market, this, of course, also depends on the traffic performed by
the parties involved. As seen by the AerLingus case, the basis was
a city pair analysis.. Depending on the agreement or measures
61. Council Regulation No. 3975/87, art. 12, O.J. 374/1, at 5 (1987) , as amended,
OJ. L 240/1, at 5 (1992).
62. Commission Regulation No. 84/91, O.J. L 10/1 (1991).
1998] AIR TRANSPORT AND EC COMPETITION LAW 623
involved, the situation may differ considerably from a local mar-
ket to a regional market and to a global market. There may be
an interdependence between the lines of the different air carri-
ers involved where the combination of the regional air carrier as
feeder line will be important for the international carrier's serv-
ices.
This may also change the geographical market from a nar-
row market taking its point of departure in the regional carrier's
more limited geographical market into an international market,
depending on the combined net of lines. This also seems to be,
and rightly so, the view of the Commission.
In one case, Commission case law suggests that the analysis
should aim at a wider market than the city pair involved and the
alternative routes between the actual starting point and destina-
tion. The Commission has also, in several decisions, shown its
willingness to take into consideration competitive factors outside
the traditional city pair analysis.
At the same time, there are certain cases where the Commis-
sion has been inclined to adopt a market definition based on the
provision of the services in question along individual air routes
between city pairs. A similar situation may occasionally applyin
respect of other modes of transportation.
2. Coordination Of Schedules
In accordance with Regulation 1617/93, the Commission
also exempted arrangements on joint planning and coordina-
tion of the schedules of air services between Community air-
ports, and it follows from the Twentieth Report on Competition
Policy,63 that such joint planning could also include connecting
,flights between different airlines. These different arrangements
have, according to Regulation 1617/93, recital 3, served to de-
velop and maintain air service during less busy hours of the day,
during less busy periods, or on less busy routes, as well as to de-
velop and maintain for the benefit of the air traveler of onward
connections.
Regulation 1617/93, .Article 2 (a) (ii), allows planning, and
coordination regarding the minimum capacity to be provided
63. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXTH REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY 1991, at 60, 71 (1992).
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on routes where carriers have agreed on coordination. 64 The
benefit from the block exemption, however, presupposes that
such planning or coordination does not limit the capacity to be
provided by participating carriers or serve to share capacity.
According to Regulation 1617/93, the establishment of
schedules that facilitate interlining connections between coordi-
nating parties, as well as the minimum capacity to be utilized on
such schedules, may be achieved by means of a binding arrange-
ment. This means that other types of planning and coordina-
tion have to be achieved through non-binding agreements.
The participating carriers have to be free to introduce addi-
tional services or to withdraw from the cooperation altogether
for future seasons without incurring penalties or being required
to give more than three months notice. Finally, the conditions
require that the planning and coordination do not attempt to
influence the schedules of non-participating carriers.
As mentioned above, the Commission has taken a stance
concerning a cooperation agreement between Lufthansa and
Scandinavian Airlines System ("SAS") based on Article 85 of the
Rome Treaty and considering Regulation 3975/87 as amended
by Regulation 2410/92.65 The Commission, in great detail, con-
sidered the company structure, the relative sizes of the airlines,
and their profitability.
The agreement between the parties aimed at the creation of
a long term alliance in order to carry through an integrated sys-
tem for air carriage. The Joint Venture shall be owned equally
by the parties and shall have world wide cover and common mar-
keting. It will, however, not have sufficient financial resources
by itself, but will be dependent on the owners supplying the serv-
ices in their respective names.
Although the Commission considered that certain elements
of the agreement could be beneficial for competition, the re-
striction of competition was considered to be unacceptable un-
less certain conditions were met. Such conditions were, for ex-
ample, a reduction of departures in case competitors would de-
cide to enter certain markets, the giving up of certain slot times,
the obligation to offer and allow interlining agreements with
64. Commission Regulation No. 1617/93, art. 2(a) (ii), O.J. L 155/18, at 20 (1993).
65. See Council Regulation No. 3975/87, O.J. L 374/1 (1987), as amended by Coun-
cil Regulation No. 2410/92, O.J. L 290/18 (1992).
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newcomers, the termination of certain other cooperation agree-
ments, and the duty to keep the Commission advised on certain
items.
Based on Article 89 of the Rome Treaty, the Commission
has also started investigating a number of other transatlantic alli-
ances, such as British Airways' alliance with American Airlines,
Lufthansa's alliance with SAS and United Airlines, and KLM's
alliance with North West.
A summary of the agreements of the first three alliances has
been published by the Commission with the request for third
parties to submit their comments.66 A corresponding summary
has also been published in respect to the KLM agreement with
North West.67
D. Article 90 and State Aid
Article 90 falls under the Rules on Competition, applying to
public undertakings and undertakings' to which Member States
grant special or exclusive rights. Many airlines are characterized
in this way, which is why the Commission has had reason to apply
Article 90 in some instances, although only a few.6 8 Presumably
it will be less important in the future in this field following a
continued privatization and deregulation.
This is not the proper context for going into the question of
state aid, but some words should be mentioned about this devel-
opment due to its importance for the competitive environment.
State Aid is regulated in Articles 92 to 94 of the Rome Treaty,
and the Commission has issued certain guidelines on their appli-
cation.6 9 On the other hand, it was only in 1991 that the Com-
mission initiated its first major investigation after having ap-
proved Belgian State aid to Sabena. This would form part of a
restructuring package, where the aid would be the last step.70
Since then, there have been a number of cases where that ques-
tion of state aid to national flag carriers has been examined.
Thus, the Commission has examined several cases involving
66. Commission Notice, O.J.C 289/4 (1996).
67. Commission Notice, O.J. C 117/8 (1997).
68. Re Transport to the Canary & Balearic Islands, [1988] 1 C.M.L.R. 331.
69. Commission of the European Communities, Progress Toward the Develop-
ment of a Community Air Transport Policy, COM (84) 72 Final.
70. Commission Decision No. 91/555/EEC, O.J. L 300/48 (1991).
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Air France,71 Iberia,7 2 Air Lingus,7" TAP,7 4 Olympic,75 and Air
France.
In spite of a somewhat harder attitude, the Commission has
largely allowed such capital injections but often with provisos.
Basically, authorizations of state aid injections have been granted
based on presentations of comprehensive and self-contained re-
structuring programs, designed to restore the carrier's financial
health within a reasonable time period implying or explaining
that further aid will not be granted in the future. The Commis-
sion has imposed a number of conditions on the national au-
thorities and the air carriers to ensure that competition is not
affected. For instance, the Court imposed five such conditions
in the Sabena case and twenty one in the Olympic Airways case.
Furthermore, the Commission made a commitment in 1994
in its guidelines on the application of Articles 92 and 93 of the
EC Treaty and Article 61 of the EEA Agreement to state aids in
the aviation sector, 6 not to allow any further restructuring aids,
unless it is justified by exceptional circumstances, unforeseeable
and external to the company, the one-time-last-principle. Still, a
Member State can inject capital into an air carrier under certain
circumstances. According to case law of the ECJ, the market
economy investor principle can be applied by the Commission
for determining whether or not a capital injection should be
scrutinized or not. 7 7 Consequently, capital injections into state-
owned carriers are only subject to the one-time-last-time-princi-
ple if the market economy investor principle demonstrates that
it constitutes state aid.
The market economy investor principle has been used twice
thus far. In the Iberia case, the Court concluded that is was not
a question of state aid, although the Spanish authorities made a
second capital injection. The Commission approved the plan on
January 31, 1996, due to changed circumstances and a number
of commitments made by the Spanish authorities. There are
71. See Commisssion Press Release IP (91) 1024 and IP (92) 587.
72. See Commission Press Release IP (92) 606.
73. Commission Decision 94/118/EEC, OJ. L 54/30 (1994).
74. Commission Decision 94/653/EEC, O.J. L 254/73 (1994).
75. Commission Decision 94/696/EEC, O.J. L 273/22 (1994).
76. OJ. C 350/5 (1994).
77. Kingdom of the Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek BV v. Com-
mission of the European Communities, Joined Cases 296 & 318/82, [1985] E.C.R. 809,
[1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 380.
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three further precedents of May, July, and October 1995 involv-
ing, respectively, Lufthansa, Sabena, and the French air carrier
AOM. The Sabena precedent shows the determination of the
Commission to 1) adhere to the one-time-last principle; 2) treat
privately and publicly owned air carriers equally; and 3) apply
the market economy investor principle primarily to structural,
rather than operational, conditions.
E. Swedish Examples
The Swedish competition authorities have considered some
cases concerning air line traffic and ancillary services. I will
mention them because they cover certain parts of the competi-
tion aspects.
One case concerns the acquisition rule, and here KV ac-
cepted the acquisition by the Norwegian air carrier, Braathen
Safe, of 50% of the shares of Transwede Airways AB. Through
this acquisition, Transwede would have a new and strong owner
with good knowledge of the airline business, thus making the
Swedish airline market more competitive.
Another case concerns interesting agreements, where SAS,
at an early stage, refused interlining agreements with Nordic
East. Based on the Aer Lingus/British Midland case and the par-
ticular circumstances, KV decided to sue SAS in the City Court of
Stockholm for fines. SAS has explained that it has been very
careful in not refusing to enter into an interline agreement but
just postponed a positive decision waiting for a clarification of
the situation.
A third case in the same field concerns an interline agree-
ment of a particular type, where KV has decided not to allow this
particular interline agreement.
CONCLUSION
There is a conflict between DG IV (competition) and DG
VII (transportation). The respective commissioners do not al-
ways share common views on questions that may relate to one or
the other or possibly both directorates. This may complicate cer-
tain matters.
It could also be pointed out that the present transportation
commissioner, Neil Kinnock, in different connections has ex-
pressed his concern of the generally high European airfares -
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notably certain Scandinavian routes. The competition commis-
sioner, van Miert, has involved himself in certain aspects of air-
lines competition, particularly the air mileage bonus. "Slot
times" is another important factor considered by the transporta-
tion and competition authorities.
It seems as if the whole transportation sector has developed
into an area where several questions with a competition edge
have come into focus. There is an interaction between the dif-
ferent sets of rules that have been gradually introduced. The
general frame laid down in the primary rules has presupposed a
development of secondary rules and case law, whereby an intri-
cate system of rules has and is gradually being developed.
Furthermore, as shown above, the last years have seen a
number of competitive arrangements, such as the acquisition of
some or all shares in other air carriers, code sharing, and
franchising, which may be considered anticompetitive. 7" There
is, thus, a continuous development of cooperative and corporate
measures taken by the airlines as there is an ongoing develop-
ment in DG IV and DG VII respectively. This means that it is
very hard to give a "present state of the market" considering the
different aspects. For instance, franchising has developed in an-
other business surrounding, and the group exemption with re-
spect to franchising and/or the implications of the Pronuptia
case may be questioned as not suitable for the airline business.
Code sharing is a practice that is particular for the airline busi-
ness and whether code sharing could be regarded as anticompe-
titive from the Commission's or the KV's point of view is not easy
to foresee, although, according to my view, code sharing, like
interlining, is rather beneficial to the customers, and therefore
rather not anticompetitive. It is, thus, not always easy to com-
bine the competition authorities' standpoint in certain cases
with the effects of their decisions in other cases.79 Although it is
my belief that there will be a certain caution in the application
of the competition rules without considering the particular ef-
fect on the air transportation policies.
I submit that there is a need for an overall view, where the
relevant authorities take into consideration the effects of their
78. See Airline Deregulation, supra note 3, at 555.
79. Thus I have, for instance, difficulties in understanding the Commission's view
on through rates compared to its pursuit of a need of interlining agreements.
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decisions in different cases and try to develop consistent hold-
ings. It may be worth quoting some points from Karl-Heinz Neu-
meister's personal note on "Airfares in a competitive industry."8"
This is, of course, a plea from one side but nevertheless merits to
be mentioned:
In reviewing the progress of liberalization to date, the Com-
mission sees itself as taking the lead, with the airlines lagging
behind. In reality the airlines have responded to their mar-
kets with countless new fares, but we have yet to see a single
action by the Commission which has helped the airlines to
reduce their costs.8
1
As we have seen, the slot time problem plays an important
role in airline policy and the particular importance of Heathrow
has been recognized in the case of BA and America Airlines
before the EC Commission. On June 4, 1997, a statement by
John H. Anderson, Jr. was released where he concluded with the
following words:
As a result of the challenges inherent in addressing the barri-
ers to entry at Heathrow, significant intergovernmental agree-
ment will be needed well beyond the scope of a traditional
open skies accord. In particular, additional agreement will be
needed between the United States, United Kingdom, and EU
on issues regarding the transfer of Heathrow slots and use of
its facilities to ensure substantial new entry by U.S. airlines at
the same time American Airlines and British Airways com-
mence joint operations. Otherwise, consumers in both coun-
tries will likely not enjoy the full benefits of lower fares and
better service that open skies agreements are designed to
bring.8 2
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